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Case No. 7695 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
W. R. McENTIRE and STEW ART 
M. HANSON, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and UTAH NATURAL GAS CO~I­
p ANY, a corporation, 
Resp,ondents. 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
F I L E » WILKINS 
,., ; J \~ 1 ·l 'i ~ 51J. GLENN TURNER 
-------------------------------· ~·A-t1:o1neys for Utah Pipe Line 
k Supreme \...ourt, Utah .. er \ Company, P et~t~oner. 
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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UT.A.H PIPE LINE CO:JIP.A.NY, a 
corporation~ 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC S-ER\"ICE COThi11ISSION 
OF l~T_J._\H, IL~ S. BENNETT, 
W. R. :JicENTIRE and STEW ART 
::JI. HANSON, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and l~TAH NATURAL GAS COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Respondents. 
Case No: 
7695 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
The respondents, Public Service Commission of 
Utah, Hal S. Bennett, W. R. McEntire, Stewart M. Han-
son, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission 
of Utah and the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company 
have filed separate briefs herein making the same con-
tentions and substantially citing the same cases. As a 
consequence petitioner will reply to those briefs as 
though but one brief had been filed by the respondents. 
The initial contention of respondents is to the effect 
that petitioner does not have a justiciable interest in 
the controversy in this action or to state the contention 
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another way, that petitioner is not an aggrieved party. 
We will not burden the court with a further brief on this 
point because the same matter has heretofore been before 
the court in this case and disposed of adversely to the 
respondents. In May, 1951 the McGuire Company and 
the Public Service Commission of Utah each filed mo-
tions to dismiss this action claiming, as they now claim, 
that petitioner does not have a justiciable interest in the 
controversy. Extensive briefs were prepared and filed 
by the parties and the matter fully argued to the court 
(Justices Lattimer, Wade and Crockett sitting) on June 
4, 1951. On July 5, 1951 this court denied the motions 
to dismiss. This case is therefore now before the court 
on the merits. Those portions of respondents' printed 
briefs devoted to the point that petitioner has no justi-
ciable interest in the controversy are copied from the 
typewritten briefs filed by respondents in support of 
their motions to dismiss and, with the exception of one 
case, are a restatement of the same arguments and the 
same cases presented to the court on June 4, 1951. In 
answer to the briefs filed by respondents in support of 
their motions to dismiss the petitioner filed with this 
court on June 4, 1951 its brief wherein it presented its 
arguments and cases in opposition to the motions to dis-
miss. Petitioner made two points: 
POINT ONE-Title 76 Utah Code Annotated, 
1943 expressly gives petitioner, as an aggrieved 
party, a right of review in this Court. 
POINT TWO-Independent of the right of review 
provided by the Utah statute, petitioner has such 
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special interest in the subjeet 1natter of the action 
as to "Tarrant reYie"T by this Court. 
\Ve assn1ne the court \Yill have no desire to re-
examine a matter heretofore fully briefed and argued 
before the court and upon \Yhich it has made a final order. 
Ho,vever for the conyenience of any men1ber of the court 
\Yho desires to reexan1ine the matter we have printed 
as an appendix to this reply brief the brief filed with the 
court on respondents' motions to dismiss. In that brief 
all of the cases no'v relied upon by respondents, except 
one, were reviewed by petitioner. The one case not pre-
viously cited by respondents is Arkansas Louisiana Gas 
Cornpany v. Federal Power Commission, et al (CCA 5th, 
1940) 113 Fed. 2d 281. In that case the Louisiana Nevada 
Transit Company had sought and procured a certificate 
of convenience and necessity to construct a pipe line into 
an area served by Arkansas Louisiana for the primary 
purpose of serving industrial consumers. Arkansas 
Louisiana appealed mainly upon two grounds: (1) That 
the finding of the Commission that the public conveni-
ence and necessity would be served was not supported 
by substantial evidence, and (2) that the conditions at-
tached to Louisiana Nevada's certificate relating to rates 
and other matters rendered the certificate void because 
the Commission did not have statutory power to control 
and regulate direct sales to industrial consumers for their 
own use as opposed to sale of gas for resale. 
The Court first held, at page 283, that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the order granting the certifi-
cate. It then proceeded to overrule the other contentions 
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of the appellant and in so doing made the statement 
quoted by respondent Utah Natural Gas Company (at 
page 41) to the effect that the order granting the certifi-
cate was what aggrieved appellant and since the Court 
had upheld that order, the appellant could not then claim 
that the conditions invalidated it. In order to make this 
holding the Court had, of course, allowed the appellant 
to appeal as an aggrieved party to the order, heard its 
contention that the order was unsupported by the evi-
dence and then found against such contention. 
This interpretation of the case is well supported 
by the opinion of the same Court and the same Judge 
some eight years later in the case of Cia M exicana de 
Gas v. Federal Power Commission (CCA 5th, 1948) 167 
Fed. 2d 804, discussed in petitioner's brief on respond-
ents' motions to dismiss the writ of certiorari. 
In short, respondents have had their day in court 
on the question as to: whether petitioner is an aggrieved 
party and it has not been the practice of this court to try 
the same issue twice. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS OF RESPONDENTS 
In a consideration of reserves for a projected natural 
gas pipeline the reserves might be classified into three 
categories-possible, probable and proven. If a well 
were drilled on any known structure geologists would 
agree that natural gas might possibly be discovered. If 
a well were drilled on a structure having completed gas 
wells then it might be said that there was a probable re-
serve. If a structure had producing wells in a pattern so 
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complete· that the sands 'Yere 'Yell kno,vn, that the lilnits 
of the structure were well defined, then· it n1ight be said 
there . was a proven reserve. Geologists would use more 
refined definitions but to a layman the foregoing is a 
fair statement of possible, probable and proven reserves. 
The mere existence of a structure is not enough. Like 
other states there are scores of structures in Utah some 
small and some extensive. With this in mind the respond-
ent, Utah Natural Gas Company called as its first expert, 
:Jir. Willson, a petroleum geologist who worked almost 
exclusively for Byrd-Frost, Inc. (R. 55). Mr. Willson 
identified numerous _structures and then guessed as to 
their potential gas production. As a corroberating wit-
ness, Utah Natural called Mr. Gordon, a full-time em-
ployee of Byrd.:Frost, Inc. (R. 744). These were the 
~IcGuire Company's principal witnesses on reserves. 
While there was considerable speculation and guessing 
as to the gas that might be developed if numerous struc-
, . 
tures were drilled, the only proven reserve back of the 
projected pipeline of the McGuire Company was the 
reserve at Boundary Butte. There three wells had been 
drilled to the gas zone, the English No. 1 and the Navajo 
Nos. 1 and 2. The first two wells were completed and 
the last was abandoned as a dry hole. It developed at 
the hearing that an independent consulting firm from Ft. 
Worth, Texas (Cummins, Berger and Pishny) had made 
a thorough study of the reserves at Boundary Butte. 
This report was not offered by the McGuire Company 
until petitioner had made repeated· demands for its pro-
duction and when it became apparent that the Commis-
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s1on might conclude that the McGuire Company was 
suppressing evidence, that portion of the report relating 
to Boundary Butte was finally produced. The report 
(page 20) with a correcting telegram (R. 1103) was re-
ceived as Exhibit 66 and attributed to Boundary Butte 
a total proven recoverable reserve available to the Byrd-
Frost, Inc.-English interests and committed to the Mc-
Guire Company of 13 billion 661 million cubic feet. This 
reserve would be adequate to supply the projected pipe-
line of the McGuire Company for 136 days. That is to 
say, a pipeline having a deliverability of 100 million 
cubic feet a day could be supplied for 136 days from are-
serve of 13 billion 661 million cubic feet provided no 
allowance was made for losses in transmission and de-
livery. Yet this is the reserve upon which the McGuire 
Company would have the public of the Salt Lake area 
rely. 
As to the other structures, witness Willson testified 
that no gas had been produced from greater Monticello 
and no well had been completed as a gas producer but 
still Mr. Willson said this area was a probable source 
of supply (R. 86). Mr. Willson made the same specu-
lations relative to the Last Chance structure. 
In the final analysis the McGuire Company must 
rest its case upon the reserve available at Boundary 
Butte. The basic supply then for a pipeline to cost $32 
million is a supply adequate for 136 days. The effect of 
the order is to invite the public to spend hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on gas-burning equipment to be 
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7 
supplied from a pipeline that eould not furnish sufficient 
gas for one seYere "~inter. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS THAT THE 
COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE 
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATE 
(a) In an attempt to support its thesis that the 
Commission may impose \Yhatever conditions it sees fit 
in the issuance of a certificate, the Commission cites 
Subsection 3 of Section 76-4-24, U.C.A., 1943. The sec-
tion relied upon deals \vith the situation wherein a public 
utility must secure not only a certificate of convenience 
and necessity, but must also secure a franchise from a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah. It is the Com-
mission's contention that this section authorizes the 
imposition of any manner or description of condition, 
even to the extent of condoning the proof and determina-
tion of a fundamental prerequisite to the granting of a 
certificate after the close of the hearing. It is submitted, 
however, that, to the contrary, the portion of the Statute 
quoted by the Commission for at least two reasons con-
demns, rather than supports, this view. 
In the first portion of the section referred to, the 
Legislature has set out in a general way the procedure 
whereby certificates may be issued. It has stated in 
subsection (1) that no construction shall be commenced 
without first obtaining from the Commission a certifi-
cate that the present or future public convenience and 
necessity does or will require such construction. Sub-
section 3 states that the Commission shall have the power 
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after a hearing, to issue the certificate either in whole 
or in part and attach thereto conditions as in its judgment 
public convenience and necessity may require. Immedi-
ately following this provision in subsection 3, the Legis-
lature has provided for a situation wherein it foresaw 
that public utilities might run into difficulty. Obviously, 
the Legislature had in mind an instance where a public 
utility desired to construct facilities within the corporate 
lirnits of a municipality and for which construction and 
operation the utility would need a franchise from the 
municipality. The public utility, being regulated by the 
statute under question, would also need a certificate of 
convenience and necessity. To avoid the dilemma the 
public utility would find itself in if it could not get the 
franchise without the certificate or could not get the 
certificate without the franchise, the Legislature speci-
fically provided that in such a situation the public utility 
could come to the Public Service Commission, set forth 
its intentions and show that it intended to and would at-
tempt to secure the necessary franchise. The statute 
then provides that if the utility conforms with this pro-
cedure, the Commission may . then issue a preliminary 
order to the effect that when the utility gets the franchise, 
then the Commission will issue the desired certificate 
after the utility has acquired the franchise. Finally, the 
statute provides that, when the utility presents the fran-
chise in question, the Commission may then issue the 
certificate. 
It will be noted that this is the only instance where-
in the Legislature has seen fit to provide for such a pro-
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cedure. In this one instance the Commission can issue a 
preliminary order stating that it "'"ill issue a subsequent 
certificate to take care of a situation where a public 
utility cannot, practically speaking, con1ply with the basic 
prerequisites necessary to the issuance of a certificate 
of convenience and necessity. By setting up such a pro ... 
cedure the Legislature has implied that in all other 
instances the statute must be strictly complied with. 
A general and 'veil settled rule of statutory construc-
tion strengthens this view. As stated in 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes, Section 244, at page 238: 
"It is a general principal of interpretation 
that the mention of one thing implies the exclu-
sion of another; 'expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius.' The rule applies even though there are 
no negative words excluding the things not men-
tioned. Thus, a statute that directs a thing to be 
done in a particular manner or by certain persons 
or entities, ordinarily implies that it shall not be 
done in any other manner, or by other persons or 
entities." 
As further stated in the same work, 50 Am. J ur., Stat~ 
utes, Section 434, at page 455: 
"The specification by the Legislature of ex-
ceptions to the operation of a general statute, 
does not necessarily operate to preclude the court 
from applying other exceptions. However, where 
express exceptions are made, the legal presump-
tion is that the Legislature did not intend to save 
other cases from the operation of the statute. In 
such case, the inference is a strong one that no 
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other exceptions were intended, and the rule gen-
erally applied is that an exception in the statute 
amounts to an affirmation of the application of its 
provisions to all other ca.ses not excepted, and ex-
cludes all other exceptions or the enlargement of 
exceptions made. Under this principle, where a 
general rule has been established by statute, with 
exceptions, the courts will not curtail the former 
nor add to the latter by implication. In this respect 
it has been declared that the courts will not enter 
into the legislative field and add to exceptions 
prescribed by statute." 
If the Legislature had intended that the Commission 
could dispense with essential prerequisites by the attach-
ment of conditions to the certificate such as those at-
tached in the case before this Court, it certainly could 
have so provided. The fact that the Legislature provided 
a procedure as above discussed for one instance and one 
instance only would seem to indicate that it did not wish 
to deviate from the standard procedure in any other 
instance. 
Furthermore, the portion of the statute quoted by 
the Commission is illuminating for another reason. It 
will be noted that the Legislature has given the c·om-
mission power to attach conditions to certificates in the 
sentence immediately preceding the questioned clause. 
They then proceeded to provide for a system of pre-
liminary orders followed by the issuance of a certificate 
in the franchise situation. This clearly indicates that they 
had no idea that the grant of the power to the Commis-
sion to attach conditions to a certificate in any way 
gave the Commission power to provide, by the use of 
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such conditions, for the proving of essential prerequisites 
at a later date. 
For these reasons, and in light of the clear wording 
of the statute in general as discussed by petitioner in its 
first brief under Point C, pages 75 to 84, it is submitted 
that the Commission's interpretation is untenable. 
The cases discussed by the Commission at pages 
1-! and 15 of its brief in no way support the Commission's 
contention in connection with which they are cited. The 
primary concern of the Arkansas Commission in the case 
of Re Southwestern Gas & Electric Company (1949) 
82 PlTR (NS) 52, was not that the government contract 
had not been legally finalized. Instead, it was that the 
company might construct the facilities to take the hydro-
electric power into its system and include such new facili-
ties in its present rate base before it actually began to 
take the electricity into its system. The Commission ex-
pressly negated any such eventuality by attaching to its 
certificate a condition that the company could not include 
the new facilities in the computation of its rates. This 
was the only condition attached to the certificate. 
In the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company case, 
76 PUR (NS-) 422, cited at page 14 of the Commission's 
brief, which was a case involving an application for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity allowing the 
construction of additional gas pipeline facilities, the c·om-
mission, upon the final hearing, was disturbed by the fact 
that the applicant had not attempted to secure competi-
tive bidding from financial-houses for the purchase of its 
bonds to be issued in financing the new facilities. The 
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Co1nmission noted in its opinion that the financial houses 
proposed for such financing were closely allied to and 
in fact were large stockholders of the applicant. The 
Commission felt upon the evidence presented that a more 
favorable return to the applicant upon its bonds might be 
procured by offering the bonds to several financial 
houses on a competitive bidding ba~is. They therefore 
indicated that the certificate should be issued but imposed 
a condition requiring such competitive bidding. In the 
Panhandle case, cited by the Commission at page 15 of its 
brief, the Commission had attached to the certificate 
issued to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company the 
condition that Michigan-Wisconsin should obtain ap-
proval of its proposed plan of financing by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. The apparent reason for 
such condition was that.the parent company of Michigan-
Wisconsin was a regulated holding company and there-
fore no definite commitment for financing was possible 
without the approval of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. It will be noted that the above cases are 
all instances where conditions were attached to enable 
the commissions involved to more efficiently carry out 
their regulatory duties under the various statutes in-
volved. Indeed, the cases are closely comparable to those 
cases cited by the petitioner in its brief under Point C, 
pages 77 and 78, wherein it is pointed out that undoubt-
edly such clauses in statutes of the type here involved 
were intended to assist in regulation of utilities rather 
than to allow commissions to dispense with the proof of 
fundamental prerequisites at the hearing called for the 
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very purpose of deter1nining such Ina tters. It is further 
submitted that this view adequately explains the ques-
tions raised by lTtah Natural Gas Company in its brief, 
pages 19 through :21, and the apparent inability of coun-
sel there to distinguish between conditions of a mere 
regulatory nature as opposed to the type of condition 
complained of in this appeal. 
Utah Natural Gas Company in its brief, pages 25 
through 31, has raised questions concerning authorities 
cited by petitioner in its brief which it is felt should be 
briefly discussed at this point. As to the case of Re 
.Achtenburg, complained of by Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany at page 27 of its brief, it should be here pointed 
out that petitioner reproduced a quotation from that 
case on pages 27 and 28 of its brief in order to support 
the fundamental proposition that where a particular 
applicant is seeking a certificate: of public convenience 
and necessity to perform a particular service, such an 
applicant must show, in order to establish the public con-
venience and necessity for a particular service, that he 
can furnish the service concerning which he is seeking 
a certificate. The Missouri Commission in that case had 
made a very clear statement of such view and it was 
reproduced in the brief, not as a binding precedent 
squarely in point upon the facts, but as a clear and con-
cise statement of the interpretation being discussed. 
The case was again quoted from on page 57 of petitioner's 
brief, along with other authorities there being presented, 
to point out how the Missouri Commission had con-
sidered, in a case before it, the necessity of an appli-
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cant's presenting a reasonably definite plan of financing 
the facilities for which a certificate was being sought. 
The Grand Rapids Gas Company case is complained 
of by Utah Natural Gas Company at pages 27 to 29 of 
its brief. Petitioner had quoted from the Grand Rapids 
case at pages 30 and 31 of its brief to point out how the 
Michigan Commission had required that in a particular 
case wherein a utility sought a certificate to build a 
natural gas pipe line, the utility must establish that it 
had available a sufficient quantity of natural gas to serve 
the locality it sought to serve for a reasonable length of 
time. This requirement was found to exist even though 
the Michigan statute was of a general nature similar to 
the Utah statute and did not list any such requirement 
in the section dealing with hearings to grant certificates 
of convenience and necessity. Counsel for Utah Natural 
Gas Company has apparently misread the opinion in 
that case and ·has omitted certain pertinent facts which 
should here be pointed out. The evidence before the 
Commission in that case revealed that while the reserves 
in the fields from which the applicant proposed to take 
gas were insufficient to supply the city of Grand Rapids 
with one hundred per cent natural gas for a period of 
more than four years, it was evident that the applicant 
could, by mixing natural gas with artificial gas, serve the 
city for a period of from eight to ten years. The appli-
cant was already in the business of serving the city with 
manufactured gas and it is apparent from the Commis-
sion's discussion of the evidence that, should the reserves 
of natural gas fail or prove insufficient, this artificial gas 
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could again be relied upon to furnish the connnunity 
"~ith gas service. It appears that the service of the mixed 
gas would be greatly beneficial to the consumers of 
Grand Rapids in that there "\Yould be a considerable sav-
ing in rates and a considerable increase in the consump-
tion of gas. The Commission """as obviously satisfied 
that the line "\Yould pay out in the conservatively esti-
mated minimum life of eight years. The second quota-
tion on page 2S of the Utah Natural Gas Company brief 
is not a quotation from the opinion of the Commission 
but is a quotation from the dissenting opinion of one of 
the Commissioners, "\Yhose opinion begins at 13 PUR 
(NS) page 458. It will be noted from a study of the Com-
mission's opinion that the order granting the certificate 
allowed delivery of gas only on a 50% natural and 50% 
manufactured gas basis. 
At page 29 of Utah Natural Gas Company's brief, 
counsel attacks the case of Incorporators of Service Gas 
Company v. Public Service Commission of Pe11/Jtsyl-
vania on the apparent assumption that petitioner has re-
lied upon that case in its brief. It will be noted, how-
ever, that the Incorporators case was included (at page 
35 of petitioner's brief) in a quotation taken from the 
case of Re Kansas Pipe Line &!; Gas Company) 30 PUR 
(NS) 321. 
In attacking the Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co1n-
pany case at pages 30 and 31 (which was quoted from at 
pages 34 and 35 of petitioner's brief) counsel for Utah 
Natural Gas Company points to the fact that the Federal 
Power Commission, because of the failure of the appli-
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cant to present firm contracts for the purchase of gas 
fro1n the reserves relied upon, did not issue a certificate 
in that case but retained jurisdiction requiring additional 
showing. This, of course, was pointed out on page 35 of 
petitioner's brief and it would appear that in holding 
the matter in abeyance until a further showing was made, 
rather than issuing a certificate with a condition requir-
ing subsequent proof, the Commission followed the pro-
cedure which petitioner throughout this appeal has urged 
1s a proper one. 
Counsel for the Utah Natural Gas Company, at 
pages 23 to 25, has relied heavily upon the Decisions 
of this Court in the two cases styled Los Angeles and 
Salt Lake Railroad Company v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Utah, et al, 15 P. 2d 358 and 17 P. 2d 287. The two 
cases, while similar as to parties and facts, actually in-
volve two separate petitions of the railroad company to 
change two separate railroad stations from an agency 
to a non agency status. The primary question in both 
cases was whether or not, under what is now Section 
76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, the change in status requested by 
the railroad could be granted and still comply with such 
section. The section in question requires that, "Every 
public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such 
service instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will 
promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of 
its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in 
all respects, adequate, efficient, just and reasonable." 
In both cases the Commission denied the request of the 
railroad. 
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The appeals to this Court in the Los Angeles cases 
w·ere brought tmder the same section of the statutes as 
this appeal was brought, Section 76-6-16, U.C.A. 1943. 
In both cases the primary question before the Court was 
"~hether or not there 'vas substantial evidence to support 
the findings and order of the Commission in denying the 
railroad's request. It is interesting to note that in the 
first case (involving the St. John Station) this Court held 
that there was substantial evidence to support the Com-
mission's finding, while in the second case (involving 
the Faust Station) this Court held that the Commission's 
findings and order were not suppo.rted by substantial 
evidence. 
In the first case this Court, in attempting to deter-
mine "-chat its duties and powers were on appeal, cites 
and discusses various New Mexico cases, as can be noted 
from the quotation respondent Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany presents on page 24 of its brief. As this Court 
pointed out in distinguishing the New Mexico cases, the 
New Mexico court's power of review was far more ex-
tensive than that of this Court. However, this Court ob-
served that the New Mexico Court applied, as a test of 
the reasonableness of the Commission's order in requir-
ing a railroad agent at a point where not needed for 
public safety, that both the public convenience to be 
served and the increased cost of the service to the com-
pany are to be considered. This Court then went on to 
state, at 15 P. 2d 361, that these factors which the S·u-
preme c·ourt of New Mexico considered in testing the 
reasonableness are exactly . the same factors which the 
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Utah Con1mission should consider in determining the 
question as to whether the agency should be continued. 
It further said that this Court, in reviewing the decision 
of the Utah Commission, does not directly measure, con-
sider or determine these two factors and come to an in-
dependent decision, but must determine whether or not 
the Commission has considered these two factors and 
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support 
the Commission's finding. 
On page 25 of Utah Natural Gas Company's brief, 
counsel presents a short quotation from the second case 
concerning out of state precedents. This quotation is a 
sentence from the middle of the paragraph on page 15, 
P. 2d 369, and, read in context, does not appear to con-
vey the meaning for which counsel presents it. Further-
more, petitioner has never cited out of state cases which 
it has urged as binding precedents upon the Utah Com-
mission. It has referred to out of state cases for the pur-
pose of illustrating and convincing beyond doubt that 
the Utah Commission has not complied with its statu-
tory and constitutional obligations. 
Petitioner has no quarrel with the discussions by this 
Court in the Los Angeles cases concerning its scope of 
review, so long as those discussions are read in the light 
of the cases involved and the results reached in each 
case. It will be noted that this Court reached opposite 
results in the Los Angeles cases in determining the ques-
tion of whether or not the Commission had before it sub-
stantial evidence to support the respective orders issued 
in those cases. It is also interesting to note that respond-
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ent l;tah Natural Gas Con1pany has attempted to take 
quotations from both cases in support of its argument. 
The general language of the rules and guides under which 
this Court must revie"T appeals fro1n the Commission is 
easily quoted in support of either side in a case of this 
nature. The difficulty con1es, hovvever, in applying the 
rules to the fact situation before the Court in a given 
case. It is subn1itted that Utah Natural Gas Company 
has failed, by quoting generalities and excerpts out of 
context from the above opinions, to detract from the 
contentions raised by this petitioner in its brief under 
Points A, B and C. 
(b) An examination of the· so-called conditional 
certificate issued to the ~fcGuire Company will show that 
it is conditional in name only. That is to say, a certificate 
which places in the hands of the applicant the very power 
to determine whether or not it has complied with a 
condition is not a conditional certificate but is an abso-
lute certificate. The Commission's order requiring the 
McGuire Company to show within the one~year period 
adequate proven reserves and permitting such showing 
to be made by the filing of a certificate prepared by a 
geologist selected by the McGuire Company gives to the 
McGuire Company the determination of whether it has 
met the condition. It is true the order says that the quali-
fications of the geologist must be satisfactory to the 
Commission, but what member of the c·ommission has 
the training and ability to determine the geologist's quali-
fications~ This is not a situation where the Commission 
would be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at a hearing 
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and have the benefit of the cross examination of the 
geologist by adverse parties as his qualifications. The 
Commission will be required to determine the geologist's 
qualifications based upon the representations of the Mc-
Guire Company and not otherwise. The certificate of the 
geologist is merely an opinion and it will be a simple 
n1atter for the McGuire Company to obtain such certifi-
cate. Such an order places in the hands of the McGuire 
Company the power to meet the condition notwithstand-
ing the true facts. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS THAT THE 
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF ITS 
AUTHORITY 
The Commission in its brief under the above point 
contends in effect that the order granting the certificate 
of convenience and necessity does not in fact mean what 
it says. It contends that upon the expiration of a one-
year period a hearing will be held to determine whether 
the supply of gas is adequate and that all interested 
parties will be given notice and will be given an oppor-
tunity to appear. 
If this was actually the intention of the Commission 
when it issued the order in question, it certainly is not 
manifest by the definite wording of the order itself. The 
order granting the certificate of convenience and neces-
sity (R. 1173) unequivocally grants the certificate and 
then attaches the condition, among others, that within 
one year from the date of the order, Utah Natural Gas 
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Con1pany shall file \Yi th the Con1n1ission the certificate of 
an independent geologist of recognized professional 
standing acceptable to the Commission that there are 
proven gas reserves committed to Utah Natural Gas 
Company adequate to justify the construction of the line 
and facilities, and further states that if such is not done 
then the certificate shall be null and void. 
This is the final order of the Commission as to the 
merits of the proceeding complained of below. Petitioner 
filed its motion for rehearing as prescribed by the statute 
and this was overruled. To all intents and purposes, 
petitioner had exhausted its possible resources of relief 
before the Commission. 
In accordance with the specific terms of the statute 
(Section 76-6-16 U.C.A. 1943) petitioner then took the 
only practical step open to it to correct what it deemed 
to be gross errors committed by the Commission in the 
hearing held before it. According to the statute, it had to, 
within thirty days after the decision on its motion for 
rehearing, apply to this Court for certiorari or waive its 
right of appeal from the order entered. In determining 
what its rights were under the order, the petitioner of 
necessity had to accept the order as written. It is diffi-
cult to conceive an order the language of which points 
to a more singular construction. Neither this petitioner, 
nor anyone else, can afford to rely upon the promises 
and overtures of the Commission's counsel. The pur-
ported responsibility and liability of counsel are of 
small comfort, nor can they redress the grevious wrongs 
perpetrated upon petitioner by the order in question. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
It must not be overlooked that petitioner is here 
appealing from the order entered on March 12, 1951, 
and from that order only. The undisclosed intention of 
the Commission at that time, as .now in retrospect disctis-
sed by the Commission's counsel, and the possibility of 
what the Commission may do one year from that date 
are not involved in this appeal. 
In an attempt to excuse the contents of the order 
granting the certificate counsel for the Commission takes 
full responsibility "for the inaptness of the language" and 
says: 
"It is contended by the Petitioner that the 
Public Service Commission of Utah in the Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity issued on 
l\1.:arch 12, 1951 delegated to a geologist the po,ver 
of the Commission to make a finding as to the 
adequacy of the gas. supply of Utah Natural Gas 
Company. This, the Commission did not intend 
to do and does not believe that it did do. 
"In order to determine whether or not there 
is an adequate supply of gas it is, of course, neces-
sary for the Commission to lean very heavily 
upon the testimony of expert witnesses on this 
subject. The Commission has listened to experts 
·produced by Utah Natural Gas Company, by Utah 
Pipe Line Company and other interested parties 
and reserves the right to make its own investiga-
tion to aid it to determine this fact. If the langu-
age of the c·ommission order is subject to the in-
terpretation placed thereupon by Petitioner, it 
certainly carries a meaning not intended by the 
Commission and for the inaptness of the: language, 
if such exists, counsel takes full responsibility. 
Upon the expiration of the one year period 
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granted in the certificate in \Yhieh the applicant, 
Utah Natural Gas Company, 1uay present evidence 
that it has an adequate supply of gas and ade-
quate financing available it is the intention of the 
Public Service Com1nission of Utah to again set 
the matter do,vn for hearing. All interested par-
ties \Yill be given notice and will be given an 
opportunity to appear. The burden of proof will 
be upon the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany, to prove to the satisfaction of the Commis-
sion that an adequate supply of gas is available. 
This proof, of course, must come in the form of 
testimony by con1petent witnesses. The petitioner 
in this case, as well as all other protestants, will 
be given an opportunity to controvert this evi-
dence if they feel that it is not reliable. However, 
the Commission felt that before it should proceed 
''ith any such hearing the applicant, Utah Natural 
Gas Company, should first furnish the Commis-
sion with documentary evidence which would es-
tablish prima facie that the requirements of the 
certificate had been met. It was not and is not the 
intention of the Commission to delegate any of its 
powers. When the necessary evidence is in as to 
whether or not the conditions of the certificate 
have been met, the Commission will then consider 
this additional evidence and on the basis of that 
evidence will reach its own findings as to whether 
or not Utah Natural Gas Company has complied 
with the orders of the c·ommission and is entitled 
to have its certificate made unconditional." (Pages 
16 and 17, Commission's brief.) 
We question counsel's authority to bind the Public 
Service Commission by statements contained in the Com-
mission's brief interpreting the order. But counsel does 
not stop there. Counsel now proposes to enlarge upon 
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the provisions of the order. The order is clear that if 
before one year has elapsed the certificate of the geolo-
gist and the commitment of the financial institution 
have not been filed with the Commission then automati-
cally the certificate to the McGuire 0 ompany will expire. 
Counsel now says that such is not to be the case: that 
even after the year has gone by 
"Utah Natural Gas Company may then pre-
sent evidence that it has an adequate supply of 
gas and adequate financing available." 
and the Public Service Commission will give Utah 
Natural a hearing. Nowhere in the order is there any 
provision for a further hearing or for an extension of 
time after the year for the McGuire Company to make 
proof. Obviously this statement of counsel for the Com-
mission is a recognition of the invalidity of the present 
order and an attempt to have the order supported by the 
court by representing that the c·ommission will have an-
other hearing. But n.owhere does counsel say that in that 
hearing Utah Pipe Line. Company is to have any right 
to present its proposed project or to show the extent of 
its proven reserves.· The way to give Utah Pipe Line 
Company a hearing is for this court to annul the present 
order. Such action by the court will undoubtedly result 
in the Commission doing what it should have done in the 
first instance,-. hear all applicants, Utah Natural Gas 
Company, Utah Pipe Line Company, and then determine 
which of the applicants can best serve the public needs. 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' MISCELLANEOUS 
ARGUl\fENTS 
''""" e 'viii briefly ans""er son1e of the miscellaneous 
statements and argun1ents made by the respondents as 
follows: 
1. The ~IcGuire Company suggests that the pipe 
line must be kept in the hands of "friendly interests." 
Friendly to w·hom? Friendly to Mr. McGuire and his 
associates. Unfriendly to the public interest in that the 
people of this state must continue to wait for an ade-
quate supply of natural gas while the McGuire Company 
maneuvers and hunts for a supply. Considerable space 
in the briefs is devoted to the great benefits that the Byrd-
Frost, Inc. - English interests were going to give to 
the State of Utah. ~Ir. Byrd frankly said that he was 
drilling for oil (T. 730) and if, as Mr. Senior, attorney 
for the Coal Operators, said in his argument to the Com-
mission, the wildcat driller could find the "second prize," 
i.e., gas, so much the better. 
This court will take judicial notice of the extensive 
drilling being carried on now in practically all the coun-
ties of Utah. The Byrd-Frost, Inc.-English interests, 
like Utah Southern Oil Company, Carter Oil Company, 
Equity Oil Company, California Company, Americol 
Petroleum Inc., Standard Oil Company of California, 
Gulf Oil Corporation, Skelley Oil Company, Shell Oil 
Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Stanolind, Mid-
Continental, Vernal Oil and Gas Company, Sun Oil Com-
pany, J ohnson-Bunn Watson Oil Company and many 
others are engaged in drilling Utah structures primarily 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
for the purpose of discovering oil. There is no more 
reason for the Public Service Commission of Utah favor-
ing the Byrd-Frost, Inc.-English interests with a certi-
ficate to their associate Mr. McGuire, than there is to 
extend a blanket certificate to every concern engaged in 
drilling Utah structures. Counsel argues that Byrd-Frost 
does not make a practice of selling corporate stock. Any-
one familiar with the oil and gas business knows that the 
scheme is not the sale of corporate stock but consists of 
transactions in royalties, leases and options. The sug-
gestion that Byrd-Frost has committed itself to spend 
enormous amounts in drilling in Utah raises the ques-
tion,_ to whom was the legal commitment made~ Who 
could sue Byrd-Frost if it defaults~ Certainly not Mr. 
McGuire because there is no contract in evidence of any 
commitment to him or to his company or to any other 
person, for the drilling of a single well. 
2. For some reason best known to the McGuire 
Company it points out that petitioner is the only party 
to appeal from the Commission's order. When one under-
stands the record and the parties participating it is clear 
why this is so. Mountain Fuel Supply Company has not 
appealed because the effect of the c·ommission's order is 
to keep gas from the Salt Lake area and this operates 
to the advantage of Mountain F'uel Supply Company. 
W. W. Ray, attorney for Mountain Fuel Supply Com-
pany, was frank in telling the Commission such would be 
the effect of the issuance of a certificate to the McGuire 
Company. Mr. Ray said: 
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HThe -"--\.pplicants ean1e here "Tith great pron1-
ise and great undertaking. Now they ask of this 
Comnussion an option to tie up everything in 
lTtah for a period of one to three years, and in 
)Ir. Corn,Yalrs generous offer he \vas to receive 
everything fron1 this l~ommission and guarantee 
nothing. They are not required to drill a well; 
they are not required to secure a single solitary 
dollar to get gas to this community. They may sit 
supine!~~ by when this hearing is adjourned and 
come to this Commission a year from now and say, 
"\\~e would like another year's extension, Gentle-
men, because the country is in trouble, serious 
trouble, and ''e don't want to interfere with its 
''ar program. Please _give us an option for an-
other year.'- without consideration, totally with-
out consideration, and upon two threats. 
"Our first threat was that if we didn't take 
this gas now, 'vhich is non-existent, California 
needed it very badly; and the final threat is that 
they are going to trade some of the gas, excess 
gas down there that California doesn't need over 
into this market by a trade between someone that 
~Ir. Byrd knows and something else. This is a 
trading period. These are oil and gas promoters. 
They have a corporation with $1,000, and getting 
ready for this case they have spent $79,000 of the 
1,000 -which shows they are quite generous in 
their hopes and their speculations. 
"But they have a corporation of $1,000, and 
not a sign of a commitment, and they admit the 
impasse we find ourselves in today-'If you don't 
get a pipeline, you'll get no gas, and if you get 
no gas you'll get no pipeline.' 
"Now, where does that leave this Commis-
sion~ It leaves it with people asking for nothing 
but the opportunity to secure for itself the exclu-
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sive right to come into this market for whatever 
period may be invo~ved. 
"It would be to the interest, I say to this 
Commission frankly, of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co1npany to say 'For Heaven's sake, grant this 
application, because it leaves us free. They'll do 
nothing-we know they'll do nothing. We'll shut 
out everybody else, and we, the Mountain Fuel, 
will occupy the market alone.' That's what we 
should say if we were not talking in the public 
interest here today. That's what would happen." 
(R. 1022) 
The Utah Coal Operators Association did not appeal 
because it, like Ray's client, recognized that the granting 
of a certificate to the McGuire Company would only 
"foul up" plans to deliver into this area additional natu-
ral gas and this would operate to the advantage of the 
coal operators. There is no harm to the coal companies 
in the granting of a certificate to a concern that has no 
fuel to deliver. The intervener, the United Mine Work-
ers, is in the same position as the Utah Coal Operators. 
The only other persons actively taking a part in the pro-
ceedings before the Commission were the railroads (who 
are in the same position as United Mine Workers) and 
Mr. Irwin Clawson appearing for some twenty small 
industrial and apartment house users. Mr. Clawson 
recognized that the granting of the certificate to the Mc-
Guire Company would be ineffective so far as supplying 
his clients and Mr. Clawson urged the Commission that 
before it grant the certificate that it hear the application 
of Utah Pipe Line Company saying: "And we urge at 
this time that before a decision is reached that the Con1-
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mission hear the lTtah Pipe Line and n1ake their decision 
on the basis of the con1bined evidence.'' (R. 1020) ~rhere­
fore it is little 'Yonder that lTtah Pipe Line is the only 
party seeking a revie,Y. 
3. The respondents represent to this Court that 
l ... tah Pipe Line Company came into the case at such a 
late date that the Commission had no opportunity to give 
it an orderly and adequate hearing. This is pure distor-
tion. The ~IcGuire Company filed its application on 
~fay 29, 1950. That application laid in the files inactive 
from ~Iay until late November. On November 17, 1950 
the application "~as enlarged and amended. Notice of a 
-hearing "~as published for the first time on November 
24, 1950 and notice of the hearing mailed to Mr. Turner, 
general counsel for Delhi Oil Corporation, Dallas, Texas. 
Mr. Turner was advised that the hearing would begin 
December 11, 1950. If due allowance is made for the 
transmission of the mails, the general counsel for Delhi 
had no notice of an intended hearing until virtually 
the last moment. Is it little wonder then that he and Mr. 
P. T. Bee, Executive Vice President of Delhi Oil Corpo-
ration, did not appear in Salt Lake City until the morn-
ing the hearing began~ Now, if there had been any in-
tention on the part of the Commission to grant Utah Pipe 
Line a hearing, the Commission had adequate oppor-
tunity to do so without delaying or prejudicing the ap-
plication of the McGuire Company. The direct testimony 
of witnesses for McGuire was not completed until Decem-
ber 14, 1950. The cross examination of those witnesses 
began January 29, 1951 and was completed a few days 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
later. At no time did the Commission indicate that it 
would hear the Utah Pipe Line application. In fact, 
the Commission preemptorily on December 11, 1950 ad-
vised Messrs. Turner and Bee they would not be 
heard on Utah Pipe Line's project (R. 10-13). The Com-
mission took the McGuire application under advisement 
and made its order on March 12, 1951. It would have 
been a si1nple matter for the Commission at the close of 
the hearing on February 2, 1951 to have then set the ap-
plication of Utah Pipe Line for hearing. If the Commis-
sion found itself unable to agree with the Federal Power 
Commission on a time for a joint hearing, the Commis-
sion could nevertheless have proceeded independ~ntly 
to hear the Utah Pipe Line matter. This would have re-
sulted in no inconvenience to the parties or to their coun-
sel or to the Commission. It is a common practice, as the 
Commission well knows, for joint hearings to be held 
between state commissions and the Federal Power Com-
mission. The Public Service Commission of Utah has 
held many such hearings with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
_ 4. Counsel says that petitioner might have filed in 
this Court an application for a writ of mandamus di-
rected to the Commission to compel it to hear the applica-
tion of Utah Pipe Line. If the duty of the Commission 
to determine in the public interest which of two appli-
cants could best serve the public with natural gas re-
quired the commission to hear both applications before 
granting any certificate, then the application of Utah 
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Pipe Line beca1ne a part of the :JleGuire en~P and should 
haYe been heard at the sa1ne tin1e or in sequence 'vith that 
case. But aside fro1n this, let us assume that '"e n1ight 
have obtained a "~rit of n1andan1us fro1n this Court in 
an independent proceeding, any such action \vould not 
haYe been in conformity "~ith the rules \vhieh require that 
two la\v suits not be filed \vhere one n1ay determine the 
controYersy. 
CONCLlTSION 
The bringing of oil from Rangely, Colorado by pipe-
line to North Salt Lake has built two oil refineries here 
and expanded another. The pipeline \Vhich carries oil 
from Wyoming to the refinery of Utah Oil Refining Com-
pany has resulted in a large expansion of that refinery. 
In fact, the four refineries in the vicinity of North Salt 
Lake are supplied primarily by oil from Colorado and 
Wyoming. Many smaller industries have been estab-
lished here as a result of such pipelines. No one would 
seriously contend that such pipelines have retarded wild-
cat drilling for oil in Utah or have been bad for the eco-
nomy of Utah. Likewise, a pipeline carrying natural 
gas into the Salt Lake area from the San Juan Basin of 
New Mexico would improve our economy. Petitioner 
in its desire to bring this supply to the Salt Lake area 
should be received with open arms and not be confronted 
by roadblocks of pure promotion. 
Counsel for the Commission argues there would be 
no purpose in this court disturbing the order of the Pub-
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lie Service Commission because nine months of the one-
year period will shortly expire and before the case can 
be decided by the court the year will have expired. This 
argument is no legal justification for affirming an un-
lawful order. When the one year draws to a close the 
~tfcGuire Company will, undoubtedly, apply to the Public 
Service Commission for an extension of time and this 
could go on indefinitely while Utah Pipe Line stands by. 
If the order was void in the first instance then the Com-
mission would have no power to extend the one-year peri-
od and the Commission will be compelled to hear all 
parties on the merits. If this court annuls the Cominis-
sion's order the effect will not be to permanently foreclose 
the McGuire Company from presenting a new applica-
tion. The effect will be a hearing of the application of 
Utah Pipe Line and that of any other company (including 
the McGuire Company) proposing to build a pipeline into 
this area. The effect will be a hearing on what all the 
parties "have to offer." That kind of hearing is what the 
public interest requires and is the kind of hearing which 
should have been granted many months ago. 
Neither the c·ommission nor the McGuire Company 
has adequately explained the lack of substantial evidence 
to establish the basic prerequisites to the issuance of a 
certificate of convenience and necessity, nor the complete 
disregard of the Commission's statutory duty to safe-
guard the public interest, nor the consequent unlawful 
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actions and orders growing from the arbitrary and un-
reasonable treatment of this petitioner by the Commis-
sion. The order of the Commission should be vacated 
and annulled. 
Of Counsel 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. W. WILKINS 
J. GLENN TURNER 
Attorneys for Utah Pipe Line 
Company, Petitioner. 
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
920 Continental National Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
TURNER, ATWOOD, WHITE, McLANE 
&FRANCIS 
Suite 1711 
Mercantile Bank Building 
Dallas 1, Texas 
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